2021 WL 7085254
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United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Lisa RICE, Plaintiff,

v.

UNIVERSAL BEAUTY PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant.

No. 19 C 1378
|
Signed 09/28/2021

Attorneys and Law Firms

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ORDER

John Z. Lee, United States District Judge

***1** Lisa Rice filed this lawsuit against Universal Beauty Products ("UBP") based on her former employment as a brand manager. Rice alleges that she experienced sex discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e *et seq.*[1] UBP has moved for summary judgment. For the reasons provided below, the motion is denied.

STATEMENT

I. Factual Background[2]

Rice is a female former brand manager for UBP. Def.'s LR 56.1(a) Stmt. Facts ("Def.'s SOF") ¶ 7, ECF No. 51. She was the only female brand manager in the Men's Care Division. Pl.'s LR 56.1(b)(3) Stmt. Add'l Facts ("Pl.'s SOAF") ¶ 12, ECF No. 59. Rice worked for UBP from May 2016 to December 2017.[3] Def.'s SOF ¶¶ 5, 17.

On Rice's first day at UBP, she was taken aback when CEO Yong Park made off-color sexist remarks while describing the outrageous behavior of employees at past UBP annual picnics. Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 6. Park made these comments in front of fifteen to twenty employees, including six women. *Id.*, Ex. B, Rice Dep. ("Rice Dep.") at 36:4–15, ECF No. 59-3. Park's comments made Rice feel very uncomfortable. Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 6.

Another incident occurred when Park, Rice, and two female newly-hired employees were in a supply closet, and Park made comments of a sexual nature regarding a woman's attire and appearance. *Id.* ¶ 7. These comments made Rice felt uncomfortable and made the other two women blush and look at Rice with their eyes wide in disbelief. Rice Dep. at 37:12–15. After he left, they asked her whether Park's conduct was common, but Rice was so overwhelmed that she was at a loss for words to respond. *Id.* at 37:16–19.

Park also made an inappropriate sexual remark in Rice's presence when they were seated at a picnic table outside of UBP's offices. Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 8. He accused a female director who came to sit with them of exposing a particular part of her body to him as she swung her leg over the seat of the picnic table. *Id.*

On another occasion, Park commented on how sexy Rice looked when she wore her hair up, which was different than how she typically styled it. Def.'s SOF ¶ 29. Park commented that he did not recognize her and mistook her as one of the "hot young hires." *Id.*

***2** Rice asserts (although UBP disputes) that Park habitually made sexist jokes and comments, for example, about—whether it would be better to sleep with a "fat woman" or an "old woman"; "dry vaginas"; female employees' clothes; and women's breasts and buttocks. Pl.'s SOAF ¶¶ 2, 9.

In August 2017, Ann Brodette, a UBP marketing manager, complained to Human Resources Director Soobia Haroon about Park's inappropriate comments and behavior; Haroon responded, "I know, I know."[4] *Id.* ¶ 3; *see id.*, Ex. C, Brodette Dep. ("Brodette Dep.") at 5:12–13, 10:11–12:8, 13:8–14:2. But, as far as Brodette could tell, Park's behavior did not change after the complaint. Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 3; Brodette Dep. at 13:8–14:2. When Brodette complained to other UBP employees, they also made excuses for Park's behavior and allowed it to continue. Brodette Dep. at 15:1–4. According

to Brodette, "it was an environment [where] he was allowed to be a bully and say things like that because there w[ere] no consequences for him whatsoever." *Id.* at 11:14–17.

In yet another example, UBP had organized a bus trip to a restaurant and bars for all of its female employees; Park was the only male in attendance. Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 10. While at the restaurant, Park disparaged Brodette's breast size, making her feel humiliated. Brodette's Dep. at 18:10–24. Haroon was standing next to him, and she just said, "Mr. Park, you can't say that, go sit at that table." *Id.*

Rice contends (although UBP disputes) that Park's sexist attitude toward women permeated her work environment and affected her ability to do her job. As a brand manager, Rice was responsible for conducting, directing, and overseeing all product development, marketing, and promotional activities for the Men's Care Division's brands. *Id.* ¶ 8; Pl.'s LR 56.1(b)(2) Stmt. ("Pl.'s RSOF") ¶ 8, ECF No. 57; Pl.'s SOAF, Ex. B(d), 4/27/16 Letter of Offer for Employment ("Offer Letter") (describing job responsibilities), ECF No. 59-7. Her duties also included researching consumer markets, monitoring market trends, and identifying potential areas in which to invest based on consumer needs and spending habits, market research, brand budgeting, and planning. Def.'s SOF ¶ 8; Pl.'s RSOF ¶ 8; Offer Letter.

The parties dispute whether Rice's responsibilities required her to attend trade shows and leadership meetings, and, consequently, they disagree as to whether her exclusion from them had a significant negative impact on her ability to do her job. *Compare* Def.'s SOF ¶ 9, *with* Pl.'s RSOF ¶ 9, *and* Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 22.[5] According to Rice, her participation in such activities was extremely important to her growth at UBP because it enabled her to fulfill her responsibilities as a brand manager. Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 13.

Rice had originally attended trade shows, but, beginning in October 2016, supervisor Jocelyn Stephens relayed to Rice that CEO Park had decided that a woman could not adequately represent UBP's men's brands at such events, and so one of Rice's male subordinates would attend trade shows instead of her. *Id.*[6] When Rice complained that this concept was sexist, Stephens replied, "Welcome to UBP."[7] *Id.* ¶ 19.

***3** According to Park, he decides which individuals are included in leadership meetings. Def.'s SOF, Ex. G, Park Decl. ¶¶ 2–4, ECF No. 52-12; Park Dep. at 25:24–26:4. When Rice complained to Stephens about being excluded from these meetings, Stephens replied, "it's usually the first line report in that department that would have been asked to those meetings." Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 22. Even so, Rice observed that male employees with responsibilities similar to hers were included in such meetings. *Id.* ¶¶ 14, 15.

In July 2017, Rice noticed a discrepancy in supervisor Korhan Beba's proposed pay increases between her male and female subordinates with comparable tenures. *Id.* ¶¶ 13, 20. Two male employees were given a higher raise than a female co-worker, even though Rice had given the female worker a comparatively higher performance rating. *Id.* ¶ 20. In addition, the female employee had been recognized as employee of the month in January 2016, and division employee of the year in 2017. *Id.* Rice complained to Beba that, based on this discrepancy, the female employee was being unfairly treated in comparison to the male employees. *Id.* ¶ 21. And although Beba and Park were aware that the performance ratings did not correlate to the respective raises, Beba decided to give the male employees higher wage increases, and Park approved the decision. *Id.*; Park Dep. at 43:7–46:9.

Rice sought guidance from Haroon regarding these experiences in October 2017, but asked for confidentiality because she did not want to any repercussions. Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 23; *see* Def.'s Resp. Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 23, ECF No. 64; Rice Dep. at 56:20–57:6. Rice told Haroon that Park had excluded her from trade shows and leadership meetings. Rice Dep. at 56:20–57:1. Rice also told Haroon that Beba was undermining her authority by working directly with her male subordinates without first telling her. *Id.* at 54:12–55:21. Rice additionally reported that, although Beba frequently made time to meet with Rice's male subordinates, he ignored her requests for one-on-one meetings. *Id.* Moreover, Rice said she had been excluded from Beba's meetings with her male subordinates. *Id.* Haroon kept this meeting in confidence. *Id.* at 51:13–15, 59:10–11.

A week after their meeting, Rice told Haroon that she and Beba had agreed to meet one-on-one on a weekly basis. Pl.'s SOAF, Ex. E, Haroon Dep. ("Haroon Dep.") at 51:17–22, ECF No. 59-10. But, as it turned out, although Beba may have met with Rice once, he did not meet with her again. Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 24.

From here the parties' stories diverge. According to Rice, she met with Haroon again on Thursday, December 14, 2017, to say that she wanted to formally lodge a complaint of

gender discrimination on the record. *Id.* ¶ 25; *see* Def.'s SOF, Ex. E(b), 12/14/17 Text Message, ECF No. 51-10 (scheduling a meeting at 3:30 p.m. that day). Rice reported to Haroon that Beba continued to meet exclusively with her male subordinates, excluding Rice as well as her female subordinates. Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 25. She also complained that Beba had effectively stripped Rice of authority to make decisions that were within the scope of her responsibilities. *Id.*

But according to Haroon, during the meeting, Rice again told her that she was not making a formal complaint and that she did not want Haroon to become involved. Haroon Dep. at 48:11–49:12. That said, Haroon acknowledged that, because UBP has a zero-tolerance anti-discrimination policy, she investigates all sex discrimination complaints, even if an employee informally complains or asks her not to investigate. *Id.* at 71:12–72:11, 73:5–25 (stating she would even speak to Park if she received a complaint of sex discrimination involving him under the zero-tolerance policy).

***4** According to Haroon, Beba had told her that he wanted to fire Rice over a week before Haroon met with Rice on Thursday, December 14. *Id.* at 79:5–21. But Haroon also states that Beba did not make his final decision to fire Rice until Sunday, December 17, three days after Rice had complained to Haroon. *Id.*

It is undisputed that Beba fired Rice, without any prior warning, coaching, or performance improvement plan, during a meeting to discuss her annual performance evaluation on Tuesday, December 19, 2017.[8] Pl.'s SOAF ¶¶ 36–37; *see* Haroon Dep. at 34:23–35:1 (stating that she had never had any meetings with Rice to suggest how she could improve her performance); Rice Dep. at 66:22–23 (stating that Beba had told her during the December 19 meeting that he had worked on the performance evaluation over the weekend). The parties agree that, besides Rice, UBP has never abruptly terminated a manager in this manner. Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 37.

II. Legal Standard

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); *see also Shell v. Smith*, 789 F.3d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 2015). To survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), and instead must "establish some genuine issue for trial such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in her favor," *Gordon v. FedEx Freight, Inc.*, 674 F.3d 769, 772–73 (7th Cir. 2012). The evidence considered for summary judgment "must be admissible if offered at trial, except that affidavits, depositions, and other written forms of testimony can substitute for live testimony." *Malin v. Hospira, Inc.*, 762 F.3d 552, 554–55 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court gives the nonmoving party "the benefit of conflicts in the evidence and reasonable inferences that could be drawn from it." *Grochocinski v. Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw, LLP*, 719 F.3d 785, 794 (7th Cir. 2013).

Moreover, Rule 56 "mandates the entry of summary judgment ... against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." *Zander v. Orlich*, 907 F.3d 956, 959 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The moving party has the initial burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. *Celotex*, 477 U.S. at 322. Once the moving party has sufficiently demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must then set forth specific facts showing there are disputed material facts that must be decided at trial. *Id.* at 321–22.

III. Analysis

Rice claims that she was subjected to sex discrimination and a hostile work environment (Count I). She also alleges that her employment was terminated in retaliation for her complaining about sex discrimination (Count II).

A. Count I: Sex Discrimination and Hostile Work Environment

***5** Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to "discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of ... sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

To prove a claim of sex discrimination, a plaintiff must point to evidence that, considered as a whole, would "permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude" that the plaintiff's sex caused an adverse employment action. *Ortiz v. Werner Enters.*, 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016).[9] An adverse employment action occurs where a work condition "subjects [an employee] to a humiliating, degrading, unsafe, unhealthful, or otherwise significantly negative alteration in

his workplace environment—an alteration that can fairly be characterized as objectively creating a hardship[.]" *Herrnreiter v. Chi. Hous. Auth.*, 315 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2002).

To establish a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show that "(1) she was subject to unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based on her [sex]; (3) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of her employment and create a hostile or abusive atmosphere; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability." *Tyburski v. City of Chi.*, 964 F.3d 590, 601–02 (7th Cir. 2020). Furthermore, a "hostile work environment is one that is both objectively and subjectively offensive." *Id.* In determining the objective offensiveness of a plaintiff's work environment, a court considers "all of the circumstances, including frequency and severity of the conduct, whether it is humiliating or physically threatening, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." *Id.* "Seventh Circuit precedent does not limit hostile environment claims to situations in which the harassment was based on sexual desire; rather, the harassing comments can be sexist, rather than sexual." *Williams v. City of Chi.*, No. 16 C 8271, 2017 WL 3169065, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2017) (citing *Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC*, 489 F.3d 781, 788 (7th Cir. 2007)).

UBP raises three arguments with regard to Count I. First, UBP contends that Rice cannot rely on certain events in support of her hostile work environment claim because they occurred outside of the Title VII's 300-day time period. Second, UBP asserts that certain alleged conduct is outside of the scope of her EEOC charge. Third, UBP argues that Rice has not established an adverse employment action in support of her sex discrimination and hostile work environment claims.

UBP's initial argument that certain events underlying Rice's hostile work environment claim are time-barred is plainly foreclosed by *National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan*, 536 U.S. 101 (2002). There, the Supreme Court explained:

> ***6** A hostile work environment claim is composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one "unlawful employment practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1). The timely filing provision only requires that a Title VII plaintiff file a charge within a certain number of days after the unlawful practice happened. It does not matter, for purposes of the statute, that some of the component acts of the hostile work environment fall outside the statutory time period. Provided that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability.

Id. at 117.

Morgan teaches that, because Rice's hostile environment claim is anchored by at least one event that occurred within the statutory time period, she may properly rely on other events that fall outside of the period. *Compare* Def.'s SOF ¶ 18 (stating that Rice filed her charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ... on March 15, 2018, meaning that the 300-day period began on May 19, 2017), *with* Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 25 (relying on Beba's undermining her authority and excluding her from events from March 2017 to December 2017).[10] Accordingly, UBP's motion for summary judgment on this ground is denied.

Next, UBP argues that certain evidence in support of her claims exceeds the scope of her EEOC charge.[11] Specifically, it argues that Rice cannot predicate her claims on the higher raises that Beba and Park gave to male employees as compared to a higher-rated female employee. UBP also argues that Rice cannot base her claims on her belief that Beba and Park altered her work conditions and undermined her authority.

"In determining whether ... current allegations fall within the scope of the earlier charges, ... we ask whether the current claim reasonably could have developed from the EEOC's investigation of the charges before it." *Ezell v. Potter*, 400 F.3d 1041, 1046 (7th Cir. 2005). "At a minimum, this means that the EEOC charge and the complaint must describe the same conduct and implicate the same individuals." *Id.*

Here, Rice's EEOC charge alleged that management had excluded her from leadership meetings and a business conference and that her new manager discriminated against her based on her gender. As a result, the EEOC's investigation of Rice's discrimination charges would likely have developed evidence regarding other types of discriminatory conduct on the part of Beba and Park. UBP's motion for summary judgment on this ground also is denied.

Lastly, UBP contends that Rice has not established an adverse employment action to support her sex discrimination or hostile work environment claims. This is incorrect.

According to UBP, excluding Rice from leadership meetings, trade shows, meetings with her supervisor, and usurping her authority over her subordinates did not constitute adverse

employment actions to support her discrimination claim. But there is evidence in the record that her exclusion had the effect of objectively creating a degrading work condition. *See* Pl.'s RSOF ¶¶ 9, 23; Pl.'s SOAF ¶¶ 13–15. And, although UBP attempts to downplay Beba's actions to refuse to communicate with Rice and to commandeer Rice's authority over her own subordinates, a reasonable jury could conclude that these actions could be objectively viewed as a degrading alteration in her work condition. *See* Pl.'s RSOF ¶¶ 9, 23; Pl.'s SOAF ¶¶ 13, 22–25.

***7** Next, UBP contends that Rice has not established a triable issue of fact regarding whether Park's behavior created a hostile work environment because it was not severe or pervasive. But Rice has pointed to facts to support her assertion that Park habitually made sexist jokes and comments. *See* Pl.'s SOAF ¶¶ 2, 9. She states that she felt uncomfortable each time Park made such comments in her presence. *Id.* ¶¶ 6–7. And, by at least one other female employee's account of the environment at UBP, Park's comments were disruptive and humiliating. Brodette Dep. at 13:3–7 (stating "she hated going to work every single day" because it was "a very, very toxic environment"). As a result, a reasonable jury could find that Park's degrading actions were subjectively and objectively severe or pervasive. Accordingly, summary judgment is denied as to Rice's hostile work environment claim.

B. Count II: Retaliation

UBP also moves for summary judgment as to Rice's retaliation claim. A successful Title VII retaliation claimant must show "that she engaged in statutorily protected activity and was subjected to [an] adverse employment action as a result of that activity." *Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 722 F.3d 1014, 1029 (7th Cir. 2013).

UBP first argues that, because there is no "male brand manager identified in the record with [a] 2.4 rating who had not engaged in statutorily protected activity and did not get terminated," Rice has failed to establish a *prima facie* case of retaliation. Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 12, ECF No. 50 (citing *Moser v. Ind. Dep't of Corr.*, 406 F.3d 895, 903 (7th Cir. 2005)). Because *Ortiz* applies equally to retaliation claims, Rice need not identify a similarly situated employee; rather, the question is simply whether a reasonable trier of fact could infer retaliation from the totality of the evidence. *See Lauth v. Covance, Inc.*, 863 F.3d 708, 716 (7th Cir. 2017).

Accordingly, "[t]o survive summary judgment on her retaliation claim, [a plaintiff] must present sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence for the trier of fact to infer that there was a causal link between the protected activity and [the adverse employment action]." *Everroad v. Scott Truck Sys., Inc.*, 604 F.3d 471, 481 (7th Cir. 2010). Although "suspicious timing alone rarely is sufficient to create a triable issue", *Tomanovich v. City of Indianapolis*, 457 F.3d 656, 665 (7th Cir. 2006), where the protected activity and the adverse employment action "occur[ ] within days, or at most, weeks of each other," a causal nexus may be inferred, *Mobley v. Allstate Insurance Co.*, 531 F.3d 539, 549 (7th Cir. 2008).

According to UBP, Rice's retaliation claim must fail because the two-month span between her meeting with Haroon in October 2017 and her termination in December 2017 is too attenuated to create a reasonable inference of a causal relationship between her protected activity and her termination.

But, when viewing all disputed and undisputed facts in Rice's favor, as the Court must on summary judgment, there exists a triable issue of fact regarding causation. Haroon specifically states that she did not tell Beba that Rice had complained after their first meeting, in October 2017. *See* Haroon Dep. at 51:13–15, 59:10–11. But, based upon the record (which must be construed in Rice's favor), a reasonable jury could conclude that Haroon did communicate with Beba about Rice after Rice lodged the formal complaint on December 14, 2017, and that Beba decided to fire Rice shortly after he found out about the formal complaint. *See* Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 25 (asserting that Rice lodged a formal complaint on December 14, 2017); Rice Dep. at 66:21–23 (stating that Beba told her that he had drafted the evaluation over the weekend before he fired her); Haroon Dep. at 52:17–53:17 (stating that Haroon had discussions with Beba after he had submitted his written evaluation of Rice); *id.* at 72:7–11 (stating that Haroon always investigates complaints of unequal treatment or sexual harassment); *id.* at 79:5–80:10 (stating that Beba made the final decision to fire Rice on December 17, 2017).

***8** In addition to this, Rice has pointed to enough evidence to survive summary judgment as to pretext. No other supervisor, including Park, had ever had any issues with Rice's performance. Pl.'s SOAF ¶¶ 28–30. From this, a rational jury could conclude that Beba's unfavorable performance review of Rice was a guise to fire her three days after she had formally complained to Haroon about him.

Therefore, UBP's summary judgment motion as to Rice's retaliation claim is denied.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, UBP's motion for summary judgment is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

All Citations

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Footnotes

1 In response to UBP's summary judgment motion, Rice disavows that she has asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. *See* Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. at 9 n.2, ECF No. 58.

2 The following facts are undisputed or deemed admitted unless otherwise noted.

3 During her tenure at UBP, Rice was sequentially under the direct supervision of Howard Brauner, UBP's CEO Yong Park, Joycelyn Stephens, and Korhan Beba. Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 27. Brauner hired Rice, and he was unaware of any deficiencies in her work performance during the brief period when he was her supervisor. *Id.* ¶ 28. In addition, Park had no problems with Rice's work performance. *Id.* ¶ 29. Stephens supervised Rice from May 2016 to March 2017 and thought Rice did a good job and worked hard. *Id.* ¶ 30. Thereafter, Beba supervised Rice from March 2017, until he fired her in December 2017. Def.'s SOF ¶ 12.

4 Although UBP argues that the topic of Brodette's discussion with Haroon was limited to Park's joke about dry vaginas, her deposition testimony creates a reasonable inference that her complaint involved a much broader range of Park's behavior.

5 The Court notes that it has disregarded the declarations of Hye Kyoung Jung and Kyung Bae Andy Yu because Rice correctly asserts that UBP did not disclose either of them during discovery in its Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) disclosures or answers to interrogatories.

6 Both Stephens and Park are still employed by UBP. Pl.'s SOAF, Ex. D, Stephens Dep. ("Stephens Dep.") at 4:20–21, ECF No. 59-3; *Id.*, Ex. F, Park Dep. ("Park Dep.") at 6:11–13, ECF No. 59-11. Accordingly, their statements are admissible as admissions of a party-opponent. *See United States v. Spiller*, 261 F.3d 683, 690 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A)).

7 UBP attempts to dispute this factual statement, pointing to Stephens' statement that she does not recall any details surrounding this incident. *See* Def.'s Resp. SOAF ¶ 19 (citing Stephens Dep. at 16:7–22, 19:7–25).

8 Although the annual period of review included several months during which Stephens had supervised Rice, it is undisputed that Beba did not seek Stephens' input in drafting Rice's evaluation. Pl.'s SOAF ¶ 30.

9 Rice does not indicate whether she seeks to prove her claim of sex discrimination through the burden-shifting framework of *McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green*, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Court applies the standard laid out in *Ortiz*, which instructs district courts to look at the totality of the evidence without "separating 'direct' from 'indirect' evidence [or] proceeding as if they were subject to different legal standards," *Ortiz*, 834 F.3d at 765, but does not otherwise "alter [t]he burden-shifting framework created by" *McDonnell Douglas*, *David v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508*, 846 F.3d 216, 224 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).

10 Moreover, nothing precludes Rice from relying on evidence of events occurring outside of the statutory time period to prove her discrimination claim based on events occurring within the statutory period.

11 UBP also raises this same argument as to Rice's hostile work environment claim.

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